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No portion of this document may be reproduced or utilized without the proper attribution to KAPSARC. Executive Summary V ehicle retirement and replacement programs provide incentives for households to replace used, fuel-inefficient vehicles with new, fuelefficient vehicles. For example, the 2009 United States (U.S.) 'cash for clunkers' program, formally known as the Car Allowance Rebate System, offered households a rebate of $3,500 to $4,500 towards the purchase of a new, fuel-efficient vehicle when they scrapped their older vehicle. Limited research to date on the program's cost-effectiveness and efficiency suggests that such subsidies did not lead to substantial additional sales. This was because everyone participating in the program was given the subsidy, including those who would have traded up to a lower emissions vehicle anyway, even without the subsidy.
Previous KAPSARC research (Sheldon and Dua 2018) highlighted the fact that policymakers might increasingly adopt targeted subsidy designs to improve the cost-effectiveness of such demandside policies. Targeted subsidy designs are aimed at 'marginal' consumers who are still deciding or who could be persuaded by a subsidy to purchase a plug-in electric vehicle (PEV). Those findings were based on simulating counterfactual targeted subsidy policies, using a vehicle choice model, estimated using real-world data in which all PEV buyers received the same subsidy. In this paper, a difference-in-difference framework measures the impact and cost-effectiveness of an existing targeted subsidy policy. That is, the simulationbased findings of the previous paper are validated in this study using real-world data involving a targeted subsidy policy.
In particular, this study explores the effectiveness of California's integrated vehicle retirement and replacement incentive program -the Enhanced Fleet Modernization Pilot Programmore commonly known as 'Replace Your Ride' (RYR). This provides support to low-to-moderate income households in disadvantaged Californian communities to replace their older vehicles with cleaner ones. RYR offers targeted subsidies based on three criteria: household income (relative to the poverty line, which accounts for household size); geography (neighborhood air quality); and type of replacement vehicle (i.e., internal combustion engine vehicle, hybrid electric vehicle or plug-in electric vehicle). The program currently operates in two districts with relatively poor local air quality: the South Coast air quality management district (SCAQMD) and the San Joaquin Valley air pollution control district (SJVAPCD). The overarching goal of RYR is to help low-income families retire and replace their older vehicles with newer, cleaner vehicles and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution in areas which have relatively poor air quality. This paper estimates the cost-effectiveness of the RYR policy in terms of promoting additional clean vehicle sales. The policy's impact on clean vehicle sales is identified using a difference-in-difference strategy. It involves comparing changes in new PEV and hybrid sales between eligible and non-eligible households before and after the implementation of RYR.
Results show that purchases by eligible vehicle buyers under the policy accounted for at least 54 percent of battery electric vehicles (BEVs), 44 percent of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and 78 percent of hybrid vehicles (HEVs). In other words, these sales would not have taken place without the RYR subsidy. The RYR program's efficiency in promoting additional clean vehicles sales is higher than other demand-side policies -17 percent has been recorded for the U.S. federal PEV subsidy policy and 7 percent for California's Clean Vehicle Rebate Program (CVRP). In terms of cost-effectiveness, RYR, with a per additional PEV cost of less than $17,600, is more than 1.5 times more cost-effective in promoting PEV adoption than CVRP. Within RYR, comparisons across technology suggest that the HEV subsidy is 1.35 to 2.1 times more cost-effective than the PEV subsidy. In terms of per additional gallon of gasoline saved cost, the HEV:PEV subsidy cost-effectiveness ranges from 0.83 to 1.31. Despite HEVs lower fuel economy, the HEV subsidy remains as costeffective as the PEV subsidy because of the higher percentage of additional HEV sales and the lower subsidy amount for HEVs compared with PEVs.
Using geography and income-based subsidy designs similar to RYR, i.e., targeting low-tomoderate income households living in zip codes with low current adoption of fuel-efficient vehicles, policymakers have the scope to improve the impact and cost-effectiveness of vehicle retirement and replacement programs. One common finding is that the cash for clunkers programs led to a 'pull forward' effect, where consumers purchase new vehicles sooner than they otherwise might have done in order to receive the incentive -but these consumers are not necessarily additional, as they would have bought a new vehicle anyway in the near future. Hoekstra, Puller, and West (2017) find that 60 percent of vehicles purchased under the U.S. federal Cash for Clunkers program were non-additional. Evidence suggests that a household eligible for the Cash for Clunkers incentive was no more likely to have purchased a new vehicle within six to nine months after the program's inception than a non-eligible household (Mian and Sufi 2012; Hoekstra, Puller, and West 2017; Li, Linn, and Spiller 2013) . Hoekstra, Puller, and West (2017) also find that, due to the fuel economy requirements for the new vehicle purchase to qualify for the incentive, consumers purchased less expensive vehicles with higher fuel economy, thus reducing total spending.
In terms of environmental gains, there is some evidence that Cash for Clunkers led to the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles West et al. 2017 ). In addition, do not find evidence of a rebound effect, observing instead that despite the lower cost per mile resulting from an increase in fuel economy, households did not respond by increasing the miles driven. However, environmental gains from this policy were relatively expensive. Knittel (2009) estimates an implied cost of $365 per ton of reduced CO 2 as a result of the federal Cash for Clunkers policy. Li, Linn, and Spiller (2013) estimate an implied cost of $91-$288 per ton of reduced CO 2 after accounting for the benefit of reduced criteria pollutants.
California is piloting an innovative vehicle retirement and replacement policy -the Enhanced Fleet Modernization Pilot Program -more commonly known as 'Replace Your Ride' (RYR). The policy was implemented in June 2015 by the California Air Resources Board and provides financial incentives for lower-income households to retire old vehicles and purchase newer, lower-emitting vehicles. To be eligible for the RYR incentives, households must not only qualify on the basis of income but must also live in the South Coast air quality management district (SCAQMD), or the San Joaquin Valley air pollution control district (SJVAPCD), two areas with relatively poor local air quality. The goal of RYR is to help lowincome families to purchase clean vehicles, to reduce local air pollution in these districts and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This paper uses a difference-in-difference strategy to identify the impact of RYR on clean vehicle purchases. It specifically compares changes in new plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) and hybrid purchases between eligible and non-eligible households before and after the implementation of RYR. The sample is limited to new vehicle purchases made by consumers resident in SCAQMD who owned a vehicle eligible for trade-in. Low-income consumers in this sample were eligible for the RYR incentives. Table 1 shows the RYR incentives offered to households resident in the South Coast air quality management district (SCAQMD) and the San Joaquin Valley air pollution control district (SJVAPCD). Low income is defined as having a household income less than or equal to 225 percent of the federal poverty line, moderate as less than or equal to 300 percent, and above moderate as less than or equal to 400 percent, where the federal poverty line is a function of the persons in the household. In addition to being geographically-and income-eligible, to receive the incentive a household must retire a The main assumption behind the identification strategy is the parallel trend assumption -that before RYR, vehicle purchase behavior by income eligible households followed the same trend as income ineligible households in the sample. In Equation 1, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term RYR * Income Eligible it represents the impact of RYR on the outcome variable, the probability of purchasing a BEV, PHEV, or HEV. Specifically, it is the difference in the outcome of income eligible households relative to income ineligible households after the implementation of RYR, controlling for household demographics.
Results and Discussion F igure 1a shows total monthly purchases of new vehicles in the sample by the income eligible and income ineligible households. There does not appear to be any visible increase in new vehicle purchases by the subsidized population relative to the unsubsidized population after the RYR program implementation at the end of May 2015. This can be interpreted as evidence against a pull-forward effect. However, as noted in the policy background section, since there was unmet demand under the program during this time, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not there would have been an increase in vehicle purchase in the treated population had the program budget been larger. Figures 1(b-d) show the trends in BEV, PHEV, and HEV purchase probabilities by month for the income eligible and income ineligible populations. All three appear to have relatively parallel trends before the start of the policy in May 2015. Table 3 displays the estimation results. The coefficients on income eligibility show that this population tends to be less likely to purchase BEVs, PHEVs and HEVs in general. This makes sense, as these vehicles tend to be more expensive than ICEs and the income eligible population is low income. The coefficients on the interaction term show that the RYR policy caused a statistically significant increase in the income eligible population's log odds of purchasing a BEV, PHEV and HEV by 0.237, 0.179 and 0.087, respectively. Exponentiation of these coefficients shows that the policy led to a 27 percent increase in the subsidized population's probability of purchasing a BEV, a 20 percent increase in their probability of purchasing a PHEV and an 8 percent increase in their probability of purchasing an HEV.
Results and Discussion
Using the estimated coefficients, predictions are made of BEV, PHEV and HEV purchases, both with (using actual treatment values) and without (assuming the interaction term equals zero) the RYR policy. The difference in purchases represents the number of purchases induced by the policy. The simulations suggest that from the RYR program implementation through to the end of 2015, the program gave rise to 27 additional BEV purchases, 24 additional PHEV purchases and 87 additional HEV purchases. According to official reports (CARB 2016) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 . Difference-in-difference multinomial logit estimates.
Source: KAPSARC.
percent of BEVs purchased under the policy, 44 percent of PHEVs and 78 percent of HEVs would have been additional. That is, they would not have been purchased without the policy. Assuming that some of the replacement vehicles were used, additionality would be even greater.
Additionality of 50 percent would be a substantial improvement in cost-effectiveness compared with recent policies. For example, DeShazo, Sheldon, and Carson (2017) find that before the recent change in California's CVRP subsidies, the policy cost approximately $30,000 per additional PEV purchased. Assuming an average subsidy of $2,000 -at the time, BEV rebates were $2,500 and PHEV rebates were $1,500 -this implies additionality of 7 percent. On the other hand, the U.S. federal incentive structure was found to account for 17 percent additional PEV sales, with a cost of $35,601 per additional PEV (Sheldon and Dua 2018) .
In comparison, assuming the maximum incentive of $9,500 per BEV, the 50 BEVs that participated in the program cost a total of $0.475 million. Dividing this cost by the predicted number of induced BEV purchases (27) implies a maximum per induced BEV purchase cost of approximately $17,600. This suggests RYR was 1.7 times as cost-effective as CVRP in 2015 in inducing BEV purchases. Similar calculations suggest a maximum per induced PHEV purchase cost of less than $22,000, which suggests that RYR was more than 1.3 times as cost-effective as CVRP in 2015 for inducing PHEV purchases. Assuming the maximum incentive of $7,000 for the 112 HEVs that participated in the program implies a total cost of $0.784 million. Dividing this cost by the predicted number of HEV purchases (87) implies a maximum per induced HEV purchase cost of approximately $9,000.
The within RYR policy cost-effectiveness of BEVs, PHEVs and HEVs is also computed in terms of U.S. dollars per gallon of gasoline saved. The fuel economy of the scrapped vehicle is not included in the gasoline savings calculation, to make a fair comparison among the three fuel types. It is also assumed that in the absence of a subsidy for each fuel type, the respective additional sales would go towards purchasing an ICEV with a fuel economy corresponding to the average fleet fuel economy of the treated ICEV population. This analysis arrives at a maximum per gallon cost of gasoline savings of $5.1, $7.7 and $4.7 for BEVs, PHEVs and HEVs, respectively, assuming a vehicle lifetime of 10 years and an annual mileage of 12,000 miles. Assuming 100 percent additional sales for all fuel types results in per gallon cost of gasoline savings of $2.7, $3.4 and $3.6 for BEVs, PHEVs and HEVs, respectively. Conclusion T his paper estimates the impact and costeffectiveness of California's Replace Your Ride Program, using a difference-indifference identification strategy to compare relative changes in the subsidized versus unsubsidized populations. The analysis suggests that in 2015, RYR was successful in promoting the adoption of clean vehicles. There is evidence that a majority of PEV and hybrid vehicle purchases made under the program in SCAQMD in 2015 were additional and would not have happened without the policy, unlike the 'cash for clunkers' program. This can be attributed to the highly targeted subsidy design of RYR, in that it offered higher subsidies for buying lower emitting vehicles to low-income households resident in regions with low prior clean vehicle adoption levels. Incentives for these vehicles were large: up to $9,500 for the RYR subsidy and up to $12,000 including the CVRP BEV rebate. Since the purchases were mostly additional, costeffectiveness was better than the statewide CVRP program in 2015 and the U.S. federal incentive structure. Within RYR policy, HEV subsidy remains as cost-effective as the PEV subsidy because of a lower subsidy for HEVs relative to PEVs and a higher percentage of additional HEV sales due to the targeted subsidy design. However, any decline in battery costs and improvements in the electric range of EVs would disproportionately increase the cost-effectiveness of PEV subsidies.
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About the Project
Promoting adoption of energy-efficient vehicles has become a key policy imperative in both developed and developing countries. Understanding the impact of various factors that affect adoption rates forms the backbone of KAPSARC's efforts in the light-duty vehicle demand field. These include (i) consumer-related factors -demographics, behavioral, psychographics; (ii) regulatory factors -policies, incentives, rebates, perks; and (iii) geo-temporal factors -weather, infrastructure, network effects. Our team is currently developing models at different levels of resolution: micro-level models using largescale data comprising of new car buyers' profiles, and macro level models using aggregated adoption data, to understand and project the effects of various factors at play for the adoption of energy-efficient vehicles.
